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Abstract—Current social networks are of extremely large-
scale generating tremendous information flows at every moment.
How information diffuse over social networks has attracted
much attention from both industry and academics. Most of the
existing works on information diffusion analysis are based on
machine learning methods focusing on social network structure
analysis and empirical data mining. However, the dynamics of
information diffusion, which are heavily influenced by network
users’ decisions, actions and their socio-economic interactions,
is generally ignored by most of existing works. In this paper,
we propose an evolutionary game theoretic framework to model
the dynamic information diffusion process in social networks.
Specifically, we derive the information diffusion dynamics in
complete networks, uniform degree and non-uniform degree
networks, with the highlight of two special networks, Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
random network and the Baraba´si-Albert scale-free network.
We find that the dynamics of information diffusion over these
three kinds of networks are scale-free and the same with
each other when the network scale is sufficiently large. To
verify our theoretical analysis, we perform simulations for the
information diffusion over synthetic networks and real-world
Facebook networks. Moreover, we also conduct experiment on
Twitter hashtags dataset, which shows that the proposed game
theoretic model can well fit and predict the information diffusion
over real social networks.
Index Terms—Social networks, information diffusion, informa-
tion spreading, game theory, evolutionary game.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, the concept of “social networks” has become
ubiquitous in our daily life. Due to its diverse implication,
researchers from different disciplines have been working on
social networking from various perspectives [1]. A social
network is a social structure made of a set of social actors
(e.g., individuals, organizations, websits or even equipments)
and a set of the relationships and interactions between these
actors [2]. It plays a fundamental role as a medium for
the diffusion of information, ideas, and influence among its
users. With the rapid development of the Internet and mobile
technologies, today’s social networks are of extremely large
scale, e.g., Facebook has nearly one billion active users as
of September 2012 [3]. Meanwhile, the information size on
the social networks are becoming even tremendous-scale. For
instance, there were 175 million tweets sent from Twitter every
day throughout 2012 [4].
On a social network, various kinds of new information are
originated everyday, e.g., when a new model of cell phone
is announced, some deal advertisements are released, some
political statements from a party are declared, or rumors about
actors and singers are reported. Such information can either
disappear quickly or inspire heated discussions. If one wants
to understand or even predict the final destiny of a piece
of new information, it would be rather important to study
the dynamics of information diffusion over the underlying
social network, which can be affected by multiple factors,
such as a user’s own interest on the information, the users’
social interactions and influences with each other, as well as
the “word-of-mouth” effects. Under such a circumstance, the
topic of how information diffuse over social networks draws
great attentions from both industry and academia recently.
On one hand, the study of information diffusion can help
the enterprises/polititians to achieve efficient and effective
advertisement/advocation. On the other hand, from the security
point of view, the study of information diffusion can also
help to prevent the detrimental information spreading, e.g.
computer virus, rumors and inauthentic news.
For example, Fig. 1 shows the normalized mention times
of different Twitter hashtags [5], which contains 1000 highest
total volume hashtags among 6 million hashtags from Jun. to
Dec. 2009. The highest peak is corresponding to the keyword
“DavidArchuleta”, the name of the singer who was the runner-
up of American Idol and won the Rising Male Star award
on Sep. 2009. Such information dynamics of the singer in
Fig. 1 can be used to estimate the approval ratio, based on
which his agency would adjust their further advertisement
strategy. Another example is the Twitter political index [6],
which provided the approval ratios of Obama and Romney
during 2012 USA president election through mining Twitter
users’ online information diffusion and comment behaviors,
especially after Obama or Romney delivered speeches. Based
on the approval ratio, the candidates can adjust their attitudes
in the next speeches to attract more supporters. From these
examples, we can see that the study of information diffusion
plays a rather important role in advertisement and advocation.
In the literature, there are numerous works on the informa-
tion diffusion over social networks, and here we summarize
the works that are most representative and relevant to our
study. The existing works can be classified into two categories:
diffusion dynamics analysis and diffusion stability analysis.
The first category focuses on analyzing the dynamic diffu-
sion process over different kinds of networks using different
mathematical models [7]-[12]. Whats in [7] is one of the
most earlier works that studied the dynamics of information
propagation through blogspace from both macroscopic and
microscopic points of views. Subsequently, in [8], the authors
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Fig. 1. Normalized number of forwarding of different Twitter hashtags using
dataset [5], collected from Jun. to Dec. 2009.
studied how a social network affects the spread of behavior and
investigated the effects of network structure on users’ behavior
diffusion. Rather than focusing on the behavior diffusion,
Bakshy et al. studied the role of social networks in general
information diffusion through an experimental approach [9].
Recently, as online social networks, e.g., Facebook and Twit-
ter, become more and more popular, some empirical analyse
were conducted using large-scale datasets, including predicting
the speed and range of information diffusion on Twitter [10],
modeling the global influence of a node on the rate of diffusion
on Twitter [11] and illustrating the statistical mechanics of
rumor spreading on Facebook [12]. The second category of
information diffusion analysis focuses on the stability and
consequence of information diffusion [13]-[17]. In [13], the
authors discussed how to extract the most influential nodes on
a large-scale social network. Later, a community-based greedy
algorithm was proposed for mining top-k influential nodes
in mobile social networks [15]. How to restrain the private
or contaminated information diffusion was studied in [14]
and [16] through identifying the important information links
and hubs, respectively. On the other hand, how to maximize
information diffusion through a network was discussed in [17]
by designing effective neighbours selection strategies. In this
paper, our analysis falls into the first category, i.e., to model
the dynamic diffusion process.
Most of existing works on information diffusion analysis
are based on machine learning methods through empirical data
mining, which is based on the assumption that the training set
is statistically consistent with the testing set. One conspicuous
shortcoming is that the results learned from some specified
dataset rely on the corresponding social network structure and
may not be able to analyze or predict the future networks since
the social networks are varying in a highly dynamic environ-
ment. Secondly, such machine learning based method ignores
the actions and decision making of users, while the influence
of users’ decisions, actions and socio-economic connections
on information forwarding also plays an important role in the
diffusion process. Imaging that when some new information
is released from one user or a group of users, whether the
information can quickly diffuse or suddenly disappear largely
relies on whether other users forward the information. For one
user to make a decision on whether to forward or not is based
on many factors, such as if the information is exciting or if
his/her friends are interested on it, etc. This kind of interaction
can often be modeled by using game theory [18]. Therefore, in
this paper, we propose a game theoretic framework to analyze
the dynamics of information diffusion over social networks.
Moreover, compared with the machine learning based method,
the game theoretic one focuses on the users’ behavior analysis
from a microeconomics point of view, the results of which do
not rely on the assumptions of a steady network structure and
can be generally used to analyze and predict a future network.
In the dynamic information diffusion process, on one hand,
whether one user forwards the information or not can be
influenced by his/her neighbors; one the other hand, the user
can also influence his/her neighbors’ forwarding actions. In
essence, such a dynamic mutual influence process is quite
similar to the evolution process in natural ecological systems
[19], where the user with new information can be regarded
the mutant and the information diffusion can be considered as
the mutant spreading. Therefore, we consider the evolutionary
game to model and study the dynamic information diffusion
process. The proposed model reveals the dynamics of informa-
tion diffusion among users through analyzing their learning,
interactions and decision making. Based on the evolutionary
game theoretic formulation, we analyze the dynamics of
diffusion process over complete networks, uniform degree and
non-uniform degree networks, with highlight of two special
networks: the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random network and the Baraba´si-
Albert scale-free network. We find that the dynamics of
information diffusion over these three networks are scale-
free and the same with each other when the network scale is
sufficiently large. The experiments are conducted to validate
our theoretical analysis using synthetic networks, real-world
Facebook network and the Twitter hashtags dataset.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We first model
the dynamics of information diffusion over complete networks
using evolutionary game theory in Section II. Then, we model
the dynamics of information diffusion over uniform degree
and non-uniform degree networks using graphical evolutionary
game theory in Section III and IV, respectively. Experiments
results are shown in Section V and conclusions are drawn in
Section VI.
II. DIFFUSION DYNAMICS OVER COMPLETE NETWORKS
In this section, we model the information diffusion dynam-
ics over complete networks using evolutionary game. We first
introduce the basic concepts of evolutionary game, and then
elaborate the formulation of the dynamic information diffusion
process.
A. Basic Concepts of Evolutionary Game Theory
The classical game theory considers a fixed set of players
and focuses on the analysis of the static Nash equilibrium. The
evolutionary game theory (EGT), originated from ecological
biology [19], extends the game formulation through incor-
porating the concept of “population” and emphasizes more
on the dynamics of the whole population’s strategies update
[20]. It has emerged as an effective modeling tool in signal
processing area including peer-to-peer streaming [21], wireless
multicast [22], image interpolation [23] and adaptive filtering
networks [24]-[25], as well as communications and networking
area including cognitive radio networks [26]-[27] and wireless
communications [28]-[29].
One of the most important concepts in EGT is the “repli-
cator dynamics”, which illustrates the dynamic process of
3the whole population’s strategies and can provide the system
state information at a particular time instance. The replicator
represents the player from the population, who can reproduce
his/her strategy under some specific rules of selection and
mutation. EGT defines that the replicator with higher payoff
can reproduce with higher rate, which is consistent with the
nature selection theory. In such a case, the dynamics of the
replicators can be illustrated as a set of differential equations.
Consider an evolutionary game with a population of N players
and M pure strategies X = {1, 2, ...,M}. Let ni denote
the number of players adopting strategy i and xi = niN
denote the proportion of players adopting strategy i among the
whole population. In such a case, the population state can be
illustrated by a vector x = [x1, x2, ..., xM ]. In EGT, the utility
of a player is referred as “fitness” [30], which is defined as
follows:
Ψ = (1 − α) ·B + α · U, (1)
where B is the baseline fitness representing the player’s
inherent property. For example, in a social network, a user’s
baseline fitness can be interpreted as his/her own interests on
the released news. U is the player’s payoff which is determined
by the predefined payoff matrix and the player’s interactions
with others. The parameter α represents the selection intensity,
i.e., the relative contribution of the game to fitness. The case
α → 0 represents the limit of weak selection [31], while
α → 1 denotes strong selection, where fitness equals payoff.
Note that the selection intensity can be time variant, e.g.,
α(t) = βe−ǫt which means that the contribution of game
interaction decreases along with time.
According to EGT, the replicator dynamics can be defined
by a set of discrete differential equations as follows:

x˙1(t) = x1(t)
[
Ψ1(t)−Ψ(t)
]
,
.
.
.
x˙i(t) = xi(t)
[
Ψi(t)−Ψ(t)
]
,
.
.
.
x˙M (t) = xM (t)
[
ΨM (t)−Ψ(t)
]
,
(2)
where x˙i(t) represents the variation of xi at time t, i.e., xi(t+
1) = xi(t) + x˙i(t), Ψi(t) represents the average fitness of
players adopting strategy i at time t and Ψ(t) represents the
average fitness of the whole population at time t. We can
see that if adopting strategy i can lead to a higher fitness
than the average level, the proportion xi will increase and the
increasing rate x˙i/xi is proportional to the difference between
Ψi and Ψ. Note that when the total population is sufficiently
large and homogeneous, the proportion of players adopting
strategy i is equivalent to the probability of one individual
player adopting strategy i, i.e., x can be interpreted as each
player’s mixed strategy and the replicator dynamics can be
interpreted as each player’s mixed strategy update.
B. Evolutionary Game Formulation
In a social network, when a series of new information
are originated from one user or a small group of users, the
dynamic information diffusion process heavily depends on
other users’ actions: to forward the information or not. For
each user, whether to forward the information is determined
by several factors, including the user’s own interest on this
information, as well as his/her neighbor’s actions in the sense
that if all his/her neighbors forward the information, the
user may also forward the information with relatively high
probability. Such a dynamic process of users’ information
forwarding is quite similar to the players’ strategies update
in the aforementioned EGT. Therefore, we can model the
information diffusion dynamics over complete network using
the evolutionary game as follows.
• Players and Population: The users in the social networks
can be regarded as players. All the users in a particular
social network, i.e., Facebook or Twitter, can be regarded
as a population. In addition, a large group of users in a
social network can also be regarded as a population, i.e.,
a circle in Google plus.
• Strategy: In the information diffusion process, each user
has two possible actions, i.e., to forward the received
information or not forward, which are corresponding with
two strategies as follows:{
Sf , forward the information,
Sn, not forward the information.
(3)
• Payoff : In social networks, users’ payoff is determined
by multiple factors, including the cost of forwarding
the information, the reward obtained by forwarding/not
forwarding the information (e.g, the popularity of a user
in a social network or the hit rate of a website). In this
paper, we model the users’ payoff matrix as follows:
Sf Sn
Sf
(
uff ufn
)
Sn ufn unn
(4)
where a symmetric payoff structure is considered, i.e.,
when a user with strategy Sf meets a user with strategy
Sn, each of them receives the same payoff ufn. More-
over, we assume that the payoff has been normalized
within interval (0, 1), i.e., 0 < uff , ufn, unn < 1. Note
that under different application scenarios, the values of
the payoff matrix may be different. For example, if the
information is related to recent hot topics and forwarding
of the information can attract more attentions from other
users or website, the payoff matrix should have the
following characteristic: uff ≥ ufn ≥ unn. On the other
hand, if the information is about useless advertisements,
the payoff matrix would exhibit unn ≥ ufn ≥ uff .
From the formulation, we can see that the dynamics of
information diffusion over social network shares fundamental
similarities with the strategy updating in the evolutionary
game. In the following subsection, we will model the dynamic
information diffusion process using replicator dynamics.
C. Information Diffusion Dynamics over Complete Network
In a complete network, each user has possible interactions
with all other users. Under such a circumstance, once some
information are released by a user, all other users are supposed
4to receive the information. However, whether to forward the
information depends on the strategies of different users. In
this scenario, we consider the network as a group of users
that continuously release new information. For instance, in
practical social networks, such a group of users can be a
circle in the Google pluse or a group in the Facebook. Since
each user in the group also connects to other users outside the
group, the more users in the group forward the information,
the wider the information can diffuse. Therefore, through
analyzing the dynamic of users’ strategies on information
forwarding, we can infer how the information propagate to
other users outside the group. Let us define the proportion
of users adopting strategy Sf , i.e., forward the information,
as xf ; and the proportion of users adopting strategy Sn as
xn = 1−xf . In such a case, the network state can be described
by x = [xf , xn].
To analyze the dynamic changing of x along with time, we
discretize the dynamic information diffusion process into time
slot. In each time slot, the users in the complete network are
assumed to be able to observe the strategies and fitness of other
users in the population. Based on the observed information, in
the next time slot, each user’s decision on whether forwarding
the information or not is determined by which strategy can give
him/her higher fitness. Thus, along with the users’ strategies
update slot by slot, the network state x also keeps changing
slot by slot. Let us define the changing rate of the network state
as the population dynamics of information diffusion, [x˙f , x˙n].
According to the replicator dynamics in (2), the population
dynamics can be modeled as follows:
x˙f = xf
(
Ψf −Ψ
)
, (5)
x˙n = xn
(
Ψn −Ψ
)
, (6)
where Ψf is the average fitness of adopting strategy Sf ,
i.e., forward the information, Ψn is the average fitness of
adopting strategy Sn, i.e., not forward the information, Ψ is
the average fitness of the whole population. Since xf+xn = 1,
the network state can be described only by one replicator
dynamics equation, i.e., either (5) or (6). From the replicator
dynamics of x˙f and x˙n, we can see that the number of users
who forward the information increases if the average fitness of
forwarding is above the average fitness. On the contrary, the
number of users who do not forward the information increases
if the average fitness of not forwarding exceeds the average
fitness.
Suppose the current network state is [xf , 1 − xf ]. For a
user adopting strategy Sf , he/she meets a user also adopting
strategy Sf with probability xf and meets a user adopting
strategy Sn with probability 1−xf . In such a case, according
to the payoff matrix defined in (4), the average fitness of
adopting strategy Sf , i.e., forward the information, can be
calculated by
Ψf = 1− α+ α
[
xfuff + (1− xf )ufn
]
. (7)
Note that we normalize the baseline fitness as 1 throughout
this paper. Similarly, the average fitness of adopting strategy
Sn, i.e., not forward the information can be calculated by
Ψn = 1− α+ α
[
xfufn + (1 − xf )unn
]
. (8)
Then, the average fitness of the whole population can be
calculated by
Ψ = xfΨf + (1− xf )Ψn
= 1−α+α
[
x2fuff + xf (1−xf)ufn + (1−xf)
2unn
]
. (9)
By substituting (7)-(9) into (5), we have
x˙f = xf (1− xf )
(
Ψf −Ψn
)
= αxf (1−xf)
[
(uff−2ufn+unn)xf+ufn−unn
]
, (10)
where we can see that the selection intensity parameter α con-
trols the speed of users’ observation and strategy adjustment.
Thus, we can summarize the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The population dynamics of information diffu-
sion over complete networks can be described as follows:
x˙f (t) = αxf (t)(1 − xf (t)) (a1xf (t) + b1) , (11)
xf (t+ 1) = xf (t) + x˙f (t), (12)
where
{
a1 = uff − 2ufn + unn,
b1 = ufn − unn.
(13)
Remarks: From the derivation of Theorem 1, we can see
that no network scale information, e.g., how many users in the
network, were utilized. The information diffusion dynamics in
(11) only rely on the initial state xf (0) and the values of payoff
matrix, which also shows the scale-free property.
III. DIFFUSION DYNAMICS OVER UNIFORM DEGREE
NETWORKS
In this section, we model the information diffusion dy-
namics over uniform degree networks, where users do not
fully connect with each other. We first introduce the basic
concepts of graphical evolutionary game, and then elaborate
how to formulate the dynamic information diffusion process
over uniform degree networks.
A. Basic Concepts of Graphical Evolutionary Game Theory
The traditional evolutionary game theory considers a popu-
lation with full connections, i.e., the population is based on a
complete graph. However, in many scenarios, players’ spatial
locations may lead to an incomplete graph structure. Graphical
evolutionary game theory is introduced to study the strategies
evolution in such a structured population [32]. In graphical
EGT, in addition to the entities of players, strategy and payoff
matrix, each game model is associated with a graph structure,
where the vertexes represent players and the edges determine
which player to interact with. Since the players only has
limited connections with others, each player’s fitness is locally
determined from interactions with all adjacent players. In
essence, the traditional evolutionary game can be regarded as a
special case of graphical EGT, where the corresponding graph
structure is complete. Previously, we have used graphical EGT
to model the adaptive networks [33], as well as the stable
state of information diffusion over social networks [34]. The
major difference is that, we focus on the dynamics analysis of
information diffusion in this paper using replicator dynamics,
while [34] focused on the final stable state of information
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Fig. 2. Three different strategy update rules, where death selections are
shown in dark blue and birth selections are shown in red.
diffusion by analyzing the evolutionarily stable state (ESS),
which is also an important concept in the EGT.
Similar to that in the traditional EGT, the concept of
replicator dynamics is also of importance in the graphical
EGT. The difference is that it is usually analyzed under
some predefined strategy updating rules, including birth-death
(BD), death-birth (DB) and imitation (IM) [35]. These strategy
updating rules are from the evolutionary biology field and used
to model the resident/mutant evolution process as follows:
(a) For BD strategy update rule, a player is chosen for
reproduction with the probability being proportional to fitness
(Birth process). Then, the chosen player’s strategy replaces one
neighbor’s strategy with uniform probability (Death process),
as shown in Fig. 2-(a). (b) For DB strategy update rule, a
random player is chosen to abandon his/her current strategy
(Death process). Then, the chosen player adopts one of his/her
neighbors’ strategies with the probability being proportional to
their fitness (Birth process), as shown in Fig. 2-(b). (c) For IM
strategy update rule, each player either adopts the strategy of
one neighbor or remains with his/her current strategy, with the
probability being proportional to fitness, as shown in Fig. 2-
(c). In the following, we will first analyze the dynamics of
information diffusion based on BD strategy update rule, and
then extend the analysis to the DB and IM strategy update
rules, where we will also show that these three rules are
equivalent when the network degree is sufficiently large.
B. Graphical Evolutionary Game Formulation
A social network can be represented by a graph, where each
node represents a user and the edge represents the relationship
between users. The users can be either human in a social
network or websites on the internet, while the relationship
can be either friendship between users or hyperlink between
webpages. When a series of new information are released by
a user, the information may either diffuse over the graph or
distinguish suddenly, which is determined by the user’s neigh-
bors’ information forwarding actions, as well as the neighbors’
neighbors’ forwarding actions. Similar to the previous section,
we can model the information diffusion dynamics over the
graph based networks using graphical evolutionary game as
follows.
• Graph Structure: The social network topology is just
corresponding to the graph structure of the game.
• Players and Population, Strategy and Payoff : The formu-
lations are similar to those in Section II-B.
C. Diffusion Dynamics over Uniform Degree Networks
Based on the graphical evolutionary game formulation
above, we analyze the information diffusion dynamics over
uniform degree networks in this subsection. In the uniform
scenario, an N -user social network based on a homogenous
graph with general degree k is considered. Similar to the
complete network scenario, the network state of information
diffusion can also be described by x = [xf , 1−xf ], where xf
denotes the proportion of users who forward the information
among the whole population. In this uniform degree networks
scenario, our target is also to derive the dynamics of xf
along with time, which reflects the diffusion scale of the
information. On the other hand, unlike the complete network
scenario where the probability that a player meets an a player
adopting strategy Sf is equal to the global network state
xf , in a social network based on an incomplete graph, this
is not necessarily true since each user only has possible
connections with his/her neighbors. In such a case, due to
the limited dispersal, those who adopt the same strategy, i.e.,
either forward the information or not, tend to form clusters.
In order to take into account the correlation in strategies of
two adjacent players, we define the local network states as xf |f
and xf |n, which represents the proportion of a user’s neighbors
adopting strategy Sf , given the user is using strategy Sf and
Sn, respectively. In other words, xf |f or xf |n is the local
network state around a user adopting strategy Sf or Sn. Note
that the local network state and the global network state has
the relationship as follows:
xf |f = xff/xf , (1− xf |f )xf = xf |nxn, (14)
where xff represents the global edge state, i.e., the proportion
of edges on which both users adopting strategy Sf . Similarly,
we have xfn and xnn, where xff + xfn + xnn = 1. Thus,
with the definitions of global and local network states, as well
as the global edge states, we can define three dynamics of
information diffusion over graph based networks as follows:
• Population dynamics: x˙f , which is similar to that in the
complete networks.
• Relationship dynamics: x˙ff and x˙nn, which are the dy-
namics of global edge states and illustrate the dynamics of
relationship among users. Note that x˙fn = −x˙ff − x˙nn.
• Influence dynamics: x˙f |f and x˙f |n, which are the dynam-
ics of local network state and illustrate the influence of
one user on his/her neighbors. For instance, x˙f |f = 1
means that all the user’s neighbors adopt the same for-
warding strategy with him/her, i.e., the user’s neighbors
are inclined to be influenced by him/her or the user is
more influential. On the other hand, x˙f |n = 1 represents
an opposite characteristic.
In the following, we will analyze those dynamics of informa-
tion diffusion over uniform degree networks, with the objective
of deriving the close-form expression of population dynamics.
Similar to the complete network scenario in Section II,
we also discretize the dynamic information diffusion process
into time slot and analyze the local and global dynamics
under the BD strategy updating rule. According to the BD
strategy rule, in each time slot, a user is selected from
the whole population with probability proportional to his/her
fitness. Then, the selected user’s strategy, i.e., either forward
the information or not, replaces one of his/her neighbors’
strategy randomly. In other words, one of the user’s neighbor is
6influenced by the user and replicates the user’s strategy. Since
the user selected for reproduction probably adopts a strategy
with higher fitness than the average, the physical meaning of
such a dynamic strategy updating rule is equivalent to that
of the replicator dynamics. Therefore, the dynamics of the
network states updated under BD rule is also expected to
be derived as a set of differential equations, as in (2). In
the following derivation, we only consider the weak selection
scenario, i.e., the selection intensity parameter α→ 0. Under
the weak selection, the payoff obtained from the interactions
is considered as limited contribution to the overall fitness of
each player, as we can see in (1). Note that the results derived
from weak selection often remain as valid approximations for
larger selection strength [31]. Moreover, the weak selection
assumption can help to achieve a close-form analysis of the
dynamic information diffusion process and better reveal how
the strategy diffuses over the network.
1) Influence Dynamics and Relationship Dynamics: Con-
sider an N -user social network with uniform degree k. When
some new information are released by a user, whether other
users forward the information or not is assumed to follow the
BD strategy update rule. Firstly, there is a possible instance
that a user adopting strategy Sn is influenced by his/her
neighbors adopting strategy Sf and deviates from his/her
strategy Sn. In a social network, this is corresponding to
the scenario that if a user finds some hot information being
forwarded among his/her friends, then the user would also
decide to forward such kind of information. According to the
BD strategy update rule, such an instance happens when a
user adopting strategy Sf is selected for reproduction and
replaces a neighbor adopting strategy Sn. In such a case, this
(Sf ,Sn) pair will switch to an (Sf ,Sf) pair. Meanwhile,
the replaced neighbor, who replicates the strategy Sf , also
generates another (k−1)xf |n (Sf ,Sf) pairs on average. Thus,
the (Sf ,Sf ) pairs increase 1 + (k − 1)xf |n in total if the
instance occurs. Note that the instance occurs with probability
xf (1 − xf |f ), where xf is the local selection probability and
1− xf |f is the local replacement probability. Overall, we can
summarize that in a unit update period, the (Sf ,Sf) pairs
averagely increases
Pi = xf (1− xf |f )
[
1 + (k − 1)xf |n
]
. (15)
Secondly, there is another possible instance that a user
adopting strategy Sf is influenced by his/her neighbors adopt-
ing strategy Sn and deviates from his/her strategy Sf . In a
social network, this is corresponding to the scenario that if a
user finds the information he/she forwarded has drawn little
attention from his/her friends, then the user would decide not
to forward such kind of information in the future. According
to the BD strategy update rule, such an instance happens when
a user adopting strategy Sn is selected for reproduction and
replaces a neighbor adopting strategy Sf , which leads to the
(Sf ,Sf) pairs decreasing (k − 1)xf |f . In such a case, in a
unit update period, the (Sf ,Sf) pairs averagely decreases
Pd = (1− xf )xf |n(k − 1)xf |f . (16)
We assume that there are N unit period in each time slot,
i.e., there are N sub-slots and only one update occurs in each
sub-slot. Combining (15) and (16), the expected changes of
the global edge state xff in one time slot, i.e., the relationship
dynamics x˙ff , can be written as
x˙ff =
Nxf (1− xf |f )
[
1 + (k − 1)xf |n
]
Nk/2
−
N(1− xf )xf |n(k − 1)xf |f
Nk/2
, (17)
where the denominator Nk/2 is the total number of edges
in the network. Similarly, we can have the other relationship
dynamics x˙nn as follows:
x˙nn =
N(1− xf )
[
1 + (k − 1)xn|f
]
Nk/2
−
Nxf (1− xf |f )(k − 1)xn|n
Nk/2
. (18)
According to [35], Ohtsukia and Nowak found that the local
network states xf |f and xf |n change with a rate of order 1,
while the global network state xf changes with a rate of order
α, which controls the speed of dynamics. In such a case, due
to the weak selection, the local network states will converge to
equilibria in a much faster rate than the global network state.
Therefore, we have a separation of two time scales, and thus,
the global network state xf can be regarded as constant during
the convergence of influence dynamics x˙f |f and x˙f |n. This is
because the dynamics of local network state are only in terms
of a local area, which contains at most k users. Therefore,
in such a small scale, the local dynamics can change and
converge quite fast. However, the dynamics of global network
state are associated with all users, i.e., the whole networks, the
dynamics would be much slower. Based on the relationship
dynamics in (17) and (18), the influence dynamics x˙f |f and
x˙f |n can be derived as follows:
x˙f |f =
x˙ff
xf
=
xf (1− xf |f )
[
1+(k − 1)xf |n
]
−(1− xf )xf |n(k − 1)xf |f
kxf/2
=
(1− xf |f )
[
1 + (k − 1)xf |n
]
− (1− xf |f )(k − 1)xf |f
k/2
=
2
k
{
1+(k − 1)
[
xf |fxf |f+xf |n
(
1−xf |f)
]
−kxf |f
}
, (19)
and
x˙f |n = 1−
x˙nn
1− xf
=
2
k
{
(k − 1)
[
xf |fxf |n + xf |n(1− xf |n)
]
− kxf |n
}
. (20)
By setting x˙f |n = x˙f |f = 0 and using the relationships
described in (14), we can obtain the stable points (equilibrium)
of the influence dynamics as
x∗f |n =
(k − 2)xf
k − 1
, x∗f |f =
(k − 2)xf + 1
k − 1
. (21)
72) Population Dynamics: Given the dynamics of local
network states, i.e., the influence dynamics, we can derive
the population dynamics by analyzing users’ global strategy
update. There are two cases that can lead to the dynamics of
global network state xf as follows.
• Case 1: If a user’s strategy is updated from Sn to Sf ,
the global network state xf will increase a unit.
• Case 2: if a user’s strategy is updated from Sf to Sn,
the global network state xf will decrease a unit.
According to the BD strategy update rule, a user changing
his/her strategy is due to the strategy replacement (replication)
of his/her neighbor, who is with higher fitness and selected
for reproduction. In such a case, Case 1 occurs when a
user with strategy Sf is chosen for reproduction and one of
his/her neighbors, who was adopting strategy Sn, replicates
the strategy Sf . In other words, one of the user’s neighbors is
influenced by him/her through observation and interaction, and
changes the strategy from Sn to Sf . On the other hand, Case 2
occurs when a user with strategy Sn is chosen for reproduction
and one of his/her neighbors, who was adopting strategy Sf ,
replicates the strategy Sn. In other words, one of the user’s
neighbors is influenced by him/her and changes the strategy
from Sf to Sn. Through analyzing the occurrence probability
of Case 1 and Case 2, we can calculate the expected changing
of the global state xf in each time slot, which is just the
population dynamics, as shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: The population dynamics of information diffu-
sion over uniform degree networks under Birth-Death strategy
update rule can be described as follows:
x˙f (t) =
α(k − 2)
(k − 1)
xf (t)(1 − xf (t)) (a2xf (t) + b2) , (22)
xf (t+ 1) = xf (t) + x˙f (t), (23)
where
{
a2 = (k − 2)(uff − 2ufn + unn),
b2 = uff + (k − 2)ufn − (k − 1)unn.
(24)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Remarks: From Theorem 2, we can see that the form of
population dynamics of information diffusion over uniform
degree networks is quite similar to that over complete network
in (11). The dynamics in (22) only rely on the initial state
xf (0), the values of payoff matrix and the degree of the net-
work, regardless of the network scale information. Therefore,
the population dynamics of information diffusion over uniform
degree networks also shows the scale-free property. Moreover,
in real social networks, the degree of each user usually exhibits
that k ≫ 2. In such a case, (22) can be further approximated
by
x˙f =
α(k − 2)2
(k − 1)
xf (1 − xf )
[
(uff − 2ufn + unn)xf
+
uff − unn
k − 2
+ ufn − unn
]
= α′xf (1−xf)
[
(uff−2ufn+unn)xf+ufn−unn
]
, (25)
where α′ = α(k−2)
2
(k−1) . We can see that, the population dynamics
of information diffusion over uniform degree networks are
exactly same as that over complete network as in (11). This is
because, in a uniform degree network with sufficiently large
degree, i.e., each user is with sufficiently large number of
neighbors, the information forwarding strategy of one user is
influenced by a large number of other users, which is similar
to that in the complete networks. In essence, the complete
network is a special case of the uniform degree networks when
k → N . Moreover, such a phenomenon also validates that the
dynamics derived by the BD strategy update rule is equivalent
with the replicator dynamics in complete networks. Up to now,
Theorem 2 shows the dynamics of information diffusion under
BD strategy update rule. The following theorem will show the
relationship between the dynamics of information diffusion
under BD, DB and IM strategy update rules.
Theorem 3: The population dynamics of information diffu-
sion over uniform degree networks under Birth-Death strategy
update rule, Death-Birth strategy update rule and Imitation
strategy update rule are equivalent when the network degree
is sufficiently large.
Proof: See Appendix B.
IV. DIFFUSION DYNAMICS OVER NON-UNIFORM DEGREE
NETWORKS
In this section, we extend the analysis in last section to
the non-uniform degree networks scenario. In the non-uniform
scenario, we consider an N -user social network based on a
graph whose degree exhibits distribution λ(k). This distri-
bution means that when randomly choosing one user on the
network, the probability of the chosen user with k neighbors
is λ(k). In such a case, the average degree of the network is
k =
+∞∑
k=0
λ(k)k. (26)
Note that we do not take degree correlation into account,
i.e., the degrees of all users are independent of each other.
Similar to the analysis in Section III, the information diffusion
dynamics over non-uniform degree networks can also be
modeled by graphical evolutionary game and the formulation
is no different with that in Section III-B except the graph
structure. In the following, we first analyze the general case of
information diffusion dynamics over non-uniform degree net-
works under BD strategy update rule. Then, we highlight two
special cases, i.e., two kinds of typical networks, Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
random network and Baraba´si-Albert scale-free networks.
A. General Case
The analytical method of the non-uniform scenario is same
with that in Section III-C, i.e., first deriving the relationship
and influence dynamics and finding the corresponding equilib-
rium, and then deriving the population dynamics. Therefore,
we can follow the same derivations in Section III-C to derive
the population dynamics of information diffusion over non-
uniform networks. While the difference is that the distribution
of users’ degrees should be taken into account. According to
the BD strategy update rule, there are two kinds of users:
the selected user and the replaced neighbor. It is obvious
that the degree of the selected user obeys distribution λ(k).
8However, the replaced neighbor does not since if a pair is
selected by random, the degree distribution of the user on the
specific pair is not λ(k) but rather kλ(k)∑+∞
k=0
kλ(k)
[36]. Through
taking different expectations with respect to the different kinds
of users’ degree, we can derive the population dynamics of
information diffusion over non-uniform degree networks in the
following theorem.
Theorem 4: The population dynamics of information dif-
fusion over non-uniform degree networks under Birth-Death
strategy update rule can be described as follows:
x˙f (t)=
α(k−1)(k2−2k)
(k2 − k)2
xf (t)(1−xf(t)) (a3xf (t)+b3) ,
(27)
xf (t+ 1) = xf (t) + x˙f (t), (28)
where
{
a3 = (k2 − 2k)(uff − 2ufn + unn),
b3 = kuff + (k2 − 2k)ufn − (k2 − k)unn.
(29)
Proof: See Appendix C.
Remarks: From Theorem 4, we can see that the informa-
tion diffusion dynamics over non-uniform degree networks
maintain the similar form as in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2.
However, the scale-free property may not hold due to the term
k2 =
∑+∞
k=0 k
2λ(k), which is the expectation of k2 and may
contain the network scale information. Moreover, in [34], we
analyzed the evolutionary stable states of information diffusion
under IM strategy update rule. Here, in Theorem 4, we can also
find three stable states 0, 1 and b3a3 in (27), which is consistent
with the results in [34].
B. Two Special Cases
In this subsection, we discuss two special cases of the non-
uniform degree networks, Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random network [37]
and Baraba´si-Albert scale-free network [38]. For the Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi random (ER) network, the degree follows a Poisson
distribution, i.e.,
λER(k) =
e−kk
k
k!
and k2 = k(k + 1). (30)
In such a case, according to Theorem 4, the population
dynamics of information diffusion over Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random
network are
x˙ERf = α
(
k − 1
k
)2
xERf (1 − x
ER
f )[
(k − 1)(uff − 2ufn + unn)x
ER
f +
uff + (k − 1)ufn − kunn
]
. (31)
When the average degree of the network k ≫ 1, x˙ERf in (31)
can be approximated by
x˙ERf = αERx
ER
f (1−x
ER
f )
[
(uff−2ufn+unn)xf+ufn−unn
]
,
(32)
where αER = α (k−1)
3
k
2 ≈ αk. We can see that the population
dynamics in Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random network shares exactly the
same form with that in complete network and uniform degree
network (when the uniform degree k ≫ 2). Moreover, since
α is adjustable, by taking α = α′
k
, we can see that x˙ERf would
also become scale-free.
For the Baraba´si-Albert scale-free (BA) network, the degree
follows a power law distribution, i.e.,
λBA(k) ∝ k
−ξ and k2=˙k2 logN/4 (when ξ = 3). (33)
In such a case, according to Theorem 4, the information
diffusion dynamics of Baraba´si-Albert scale-free network are
x˙BAf =
α(k − 1)(k logN/4− 2)
(k logN/4− 1)2
xBAf (1− x
BA
f )·[
(k logN/4− 2)(uff − 2ufn + unn)x
BA
f + uff+
(k logN/4− 2)ufn − (k logN/4− 1)unn
]
. (34)
When the network scale N is sufficiently large, x˙BAf in (34)
can be approximated by
x˙BAf = αBAx
BA
f (1−x
BA
f )
[
(uff−2ufn+unn)x
BA
f +ufn−unn
]
,
(35)
where αBA = α(k−1)(k logN/4−2)
2
(k logN/4−1)2
≈ α(k − 1). Thus, the
population dynamics in Baraba´si-Albert scale-free network
also shares exactly the same form with that in complete
network, and by taking α = α
′
k−1
, x˙BAf would also become
scale-free.
V. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we conduct experiments to verify the in-
formation diffusion dynamics analysis. First, we simulate the
information diffusion process on synthetic networks and real-
world network, i.e., the Facebook social network to verify our
theoretical analysis by setting different payoff matrices. Then,
we use the Twitter hashtags dataset to estimate the payoff
matrix corresponding to each hashtag by fitting the curve of
real-world information diffusion process.
A. Synthetic Networks and Real-World Network
In the experiment of synthetic networks, we generate four
kinds of networks to simulate the information diffusion pro-
cess:
• the complete network;
• the uniform-degree network;
• the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random network;
• the Baraba´si-Albert scale-free network.
For each network, we generate 1000 users, where only one
user adopts strategy Sf and all other users adopt Sn. In the
simulations, four kinds of payoff matrices are considered:
• Case 1: uff > ufn > unn
uff = 0.8; ufn = 0.6; unn = 0.4. (36)
• Case 2: ufn > uff > unn
uff = 0.6; ufn = 0.8; unn = 0.4. (37)
• Case 3: ufn > unn > uff
uff = 0.4; ufn = 0.8; unn = 0.6. (38)
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(a) Complete network.
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(c) Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random network.
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(d) Baraba´si-Albert scale-free network.
Fig. 3. Simulation results for synthetic networks.
• Case 4: unn > ufn > uff
uff = 0.4; ufn = 0.6; unn = 0.8. (39)
Fig. 3-(a) and (b) shows the experiment results for the
complete and uniform-degree networks under different payoff
matrices. The theoretical results are calculated from Theorem
1 and Theorem 2 directly, while the simulation results are
obtained by simulating the BD strategy update rule over
the generated network. For each simulation run, the strategy
update steps are repeated until the global network state xf
converges. Meanwhile, the network structure is re-generated
every 500 runs to prevent any spurious results based on
one particular realization of a specific network type. From
Fig. 3-(a) and (b), we can see that all the simulation results
are consistent with the theoretical results, which verifies the
correctness of the conclusions in Theorem 1 and Theorem
2. Moreover, different settings of the payoff matrix can lead
to different dynamics of information diffusion. For Case 1
where uff > ufn > unn, the globe network state tends to
1 which means that all users would forward the information
since forwarding can obtain higher utility than not forwarding.
On the contrary, for Case 4 where unn > ufn > uff , no
one would forward the information. For Case 2 and Case 3,
the results show that a portion of users would forward the
information which is determined by the relationship between
uff and unn, i.e., if uff > unn more than half would forward
the information and if uff < unn less than half would forward
the information.
Fig. 3-(c) and (d) show the experiment results for the non-
uniform degree networks under different payoff matrices,
including the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random network and the Baraba´si-
Albert scale-free network. The theoretical results are calcu-
lated from (31) and (34) directly, while the simulation results
are obtained by simulating the BD strategy update rule over the
two generated networks. We can see that the all the simulation
results agree well with the theoretical results. In Fig. 3-(d),
the gap for the Baraba´si-Albert scale-free networks is due to
the fact that there is weak dependence between the global
network state and the network degree, while we neglected
such dependence in the diffusion analysis. Similarly, different
settings of payoff matrices can lead to different information
diffusion dynamics, which are determined by the relationships
between uff , ufn and unn.
In the experiment of real-world network, we evaluate the
information diffusion process over Facebook social network
[39]. The Facebook dataset contains totally 4039 users and
88234 edges, and the average degree is about 40 [5]. Fig. 4
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Fig. 4. Simulation results for the real-world Facebook network.
shows the experiment results under different payoff matrix
settings. The theoretical results are calculated by Theorem 2,
while the simulation results are obtained by simulating the
BD strategy update rule over the Facebook graph. It can be
seen that the simulation results match well with the theoretical
results, while the small gaps are mainly due to the neglected
dependence between the global network state and the network
degree. Therefore, the experiment results verify the correctness
of our theoretical analysis on the real-world network.
B. Twitter Hashtags Dataset Evaluation
In the previous two subsections, we first setup the users’
payoff matrix, and then conducted experiments to verify the
dynamics of information diffusion over different kinds of
networks. In this subsection, a reverse process is conducted,
which means that we use the Twitter hashtag dataset to esti-
mate the payoff matrices corresponding to different hashtags
by fitting the curves as shown in Fig. 1. Note that the curves
in Fig. 1 are corresponding to the x˙f (t) in our model since the
vertical axis is the increased mention times of one hashtag in
an hour. The Twitter hashtag dataset contains the the number
of mention times per hour of 1000 Twitter hashtags with
corresponding time series, which are the 1000 hashtags with
highest total mention times among 6 million hashtags from
Jun. to Dec. 2009 [5].
Let us first derive the closed-form expression for the global
network state xf (t). In Theorem 1, Theorem 2 and Theorem
4, we can see that the dynamics of information diffusion over
three kinds of networks share the same form as follows:
dxf
dt
= βe−ǫtxf (1− xf ) (xf + γ) , (40)
where α = e−ǫt is considered as time-variance and different
kinds of networks have different coefficients β and γ. Using
the separation of variables method, we can derive the implicit
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Fig. 5. The curve fitting of different hashtags diffusion dynamics.
closed-form expression of xf as follows:
(γ + 1)lnxf − γln(1 − xf ) + ln(−xf − γ)
γ(γ + 1)
= −
β
ǫ
e−ǫt + c,
(41)
where c is a constant and can be calculated by the initial
condition xf (t = 0). In such a case, we can estimate the
parameters ǫ, β and γ using (41) through fitting the Twitter
hashtag dataset. Fig. 5 shows the curve fitting results of four
hashtags using least squares method, where the vertical axis
is global network state xf (t). The mention times of different
hashtags per hour in the Twitter dataset are first normalized
within interval [0, 1] and then accumulated over time to get
the cumulative mention times as shown by solid black square.
From the figure, we can see that our model can fit the real-
world information diffusion data very well, which means
that the global network state of information diffusion can
be accurately predicted by the proposed evolutionary game
theoretic model.
Considering that the Twitter social network also exhibits the
scale-free phenomenon and the network scale is sufficiently
large, we can obtain the relationship of the payoff matrix
according to (35) by setting αBA = e−ǫtk−1 as follows:
uff − 2ufn + unn = β, (42)
ufn − unn = βγ. (43)
If ufn is normalized as 1, then we can calculate uff and
unn through solving the equation set above. The difference
between uff and unn can reflect the popularity of a hashtag,
i.e., uff − unn > 0 means high popularity since forwarding
the information can obtain higher utility than not forwarding;
on the other hand, uff−unn < 0 means low popularity. Fig. 6
shows the distribution of uff−unn among all 1000 hashtags in
the Twitter dataset. We can see that most of hashtags are with
high popularity, which is because those 1000 hashtags are with
highest total mention times among 6 million hashtags from
Jun. to Dec. 2009. Therefore, using such an analytical method,
the information over social network can be categorized into
different levels according to the popularity of them. On the
other hand, it can also be used to category users in the social
network. Consider that if the sport-related information always
show high popularity in a group of users, those users probably
share the same interests on the sports, which means that
delivering them with sport-related advertisements would be
more effective.
Based on the estimated payoff matrix, we can further
simulate the dynamics x˙f (t) using our proposed model. In
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Fig. 6. Distribution of uff − unn among all 1000 hashtags.
this experiment, we compare our results with one of the most
related exsiting works [40] using data mining method, in which
the dynamics of information diffusion are predicted by the
following model
dxf
dt
= q1t
q2e−q3t, (44)
where the parameters q1, q2 and q3 can also be estimated
through least-squares curve fitting in a similar way. Fig. 7
shows the comparison results, where the vertical axis is the
dynamics x˙f (t) and the mention times of different hastags per
hour in the Twitter dataset are normalized within interval [0, 1]
and denoted by solid black square. From the figure, we can
see that our model can fit the real-world information diffusion
dynamics better than the data mining method in [40] since the
users’ interactions and decision making behaviours are taken
into account.
Finally, we conduct another experiment to verify that our
proposed model can predict the dynamics of information
diffusion. In this experiment, we only use parts of data to
estimate the payoff matrix and check whether our model with
the estimated payoff matrix can predict the remaining diffusion
dynamics. In Fig. 8-(a), we plot the prediction results for the
hashtag #googlewave, where only 25 percents of data are used
for the payoff matrix estimation, i.e., the data denoted by solid
red square. We can see that when only 25% data are used, the
prediction is effective until time index 40, i.e., in the near
future. Then, in Fig. 8-(b) where 30 percents of data are used,
the peak time can be precisely predicted and the prediction is
effective until time index 45. In Fig. 8-(c) and (d) where 40
and 60 percents of data are used respectively, the predictions
become more and more precise. This is because as long as the
peak value and time index of the dynamics are included for
payoff estimation, the precision of prediction would increase
to a large extent since the peak value and time index are the
most important information for the dynamics.
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Fig. 7. Comparison with the existing work.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we formulate the dynamics of information
diffusion over social networks using evolutionary game theory.
We defined the players, strategies and payoff matrix in this
problem, and highlighted the correspondence between the
EGT and information diffusion. Three kinds of networks,
complete, uniform and non-uniform degree social networks,
were analyzed with the derivation of information diffusion
dynamics. Moreover, we also analyzed two representative
networks: the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random network and the Baraba´si-
Albert scale-free network. To validate our theoretical analysis,
we conducted experiments on synthetic networks, real-world
Facebook networks, as well as Twitter hashtags dataset. All
the experiment results were consistent with corresponding
theoretical results, which corroborated that our proposed EGT
model is effective and practical for modeling the dynamics of
information diffusion problem.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The Case 1 and Case 2 listed in Section III-C2 summarize
two possible changes of the global network state xf . For Case
1, according to the BD strategy update rule, it is corresponding
to the instance that when a user adopting strategy Sf is
selected for reproduction and replaces a neighbor adopting
strategy Sn. Suppose the user has kf neighbors adopting
strategy strategy Sf and k − kf neighbors adopting strategy
strategy Sn. In the BD strategy update rule, the global
selection probability is proportional to the fitness. In such a
case, the user adopting strategy Sf is selected with probability
xfΨf/Ψ and the replacement probability is (k−kf )/k, where
Ψf denotes the fitness of the user adopting strategy Sf and Ψ
denotes the average fitness of the whole population. In such a
case, the expected occurrence probability of Case 1 is
P BD1 =
k∑
kf=0
k!
kf !(k − kf )!
x
kf
f |f (1− xf |f )
k−kf
xfΨf
Ψ
k − kf
k
,
(45)
which is also the expected probability of the global network
state xf increasing 1/N . Similarly, for Case 2, it is corre-
sponding to the instance that when a user adopting strategy
Sn is selected for reproduction and replaces a neighbor
adopting strategy Sf . As a dual expression of 45, the expected
occurrence probability of Case 2 is
P BD2 =
k∑
kf=0
k!
kf !(k − kf )!
x
kf
f |n(1−xf |n)
k−kf
(1− xf )Ψn
Ψ
kf
k
,
(46)
which is also the expected probability of the global network
state xf decreasing 1/N . Ψn denotes the fitness of the user
adopting strategy Sn.
We assume that there are N unit period in each time slot,
i.e., there are N sub-slots and only one update occurs in each
sub-slot. Combining (45) and (46), the expected changes of
the global network state xf in one time slot is
x˙f =
k∑
kf=0
k!
kf !(k − kf )!
{
x
kf
f |f (1 − xf |f )
k−kf
xfΨf
Ψ
k − kf
k
− x
kf
f |n(1− xf |n)
k−kf
(1− xf )Ψn
Ψ
kf
k
}
, (47)
where
{
Ψf = 1− α+ α
[
kfuff + (k − kf )ufn
]
,
Ψn = 1− α+ α
[
kfufn + (k − kf )unn
]
.
(48)
By substituting (48) into (47), we can simplify the dynamics
of global network state as
x˙f =
αxf (1− xf |f )(k − 1)
Ψ
·[
(uff − ufn)xf |f − (unn − ufn)(1− xf |n)
]
. (49)
Notice that the numerator of (49) is dominant by α which
is sufficiently small compared with 1 in the weak selection
scenario, while the denominator Ψ = 1−α+αU is dominant
by 1. In such a case, by substituting the local equilibria (21)
into (49), we can approximate (49) as
x˙f
.
= αxf (1− xf |f )(k − 1)·[
(uff − ufn)xf |f − (unn − ufn)(1 − xf |n)
]
=
α(k − 2)
(k − 1)
xf (1− xf )
[
(k − 2)(uff − 2ufn + unn)xf
+ uff + (k − 2)ufn − (k − 1)unn
]
. (50)
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In this proof, we will first extend the analysis of information
diffusion dynamics to that under the DB and IM strategy
update rules, respectively. Then, we will show the equivalence
by comparing the approximated expressions of diffusion dy-
namics under three kinds of rules, when the network degree
is sufficiently large.
A. Diffusion Dynamics under DB Rule
Similar to the analysis in the BD strategy update rule, for
the diffusion dynamics under DB rule, we also need to first
calculate the stable point of the influence dynamics, i.e., the
12
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(a) Curve fitting using 25% data.
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(b) Curve fitting using 30% data.
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(c) Curve fitting using 40% data.
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(d) Curve fitting using 60% data.
Fig. 8. Prediction simulation restuls.
local equilibria of the information diffusion, and then calculate
the population dynamics by analyzing the two cases listed in
Section III-C2. Note that since the stable point of the influence
dynamics under the DB strategy update rule is the same as that
under the BD rule as shown in (21), the detailed derivation
is omitted here. Moreover, since the DB strategy update rule
is dual with the BD rule, the population dynamics analysis
under those two rules are also dual with each other. Recall that
Case 1 in Section III-C2 is corresponding to the instance that
when a user adopting strategy Sn is selected for deviation and
replaced by a neighbor adopting strategy Sf . According to the
DB strategy update rule, the expected occurrence probability
of Case 1 is
PDB1 =
k∑
kf=0
k!
kf !(k − kf )!
x
kf
f |n(1−xf |n)
k−kf
(1 − xf )Ψf
Ψ1
kf
k
,
(51)
Similarly, the Case 2 in Section III-C2 is corresponding to the
instance that when a user adopting strategy Sf is selected for
deviation and replaced by a neighbor adopting strategy Sn,
the expected occurrence probability of which is
PDB2 =
k∑
kf=0
k!
kf !(k − kf )!
x
kf
f |f (1− xf |f )
k−kf
xfΨn
Ψ2
k − kf
k
.
(52)
Combining (51) and (52), the expected changes of the global
network state xf in one time slot is
x˙f =
k∑
kf=0
k!
kf !(k − kf )!
{
x
kf
f |n(1− xf |n)
k−kf
(1− xf )Ψf
Ψ
kf
k
− x
kf
f |f (1− xf |f )
k−kf
xfΨn
Ψ
k − kf
k
}
, (53)
where{
Ψf =1− α+ α
[
(k − 1)(xf |fuff + (1− xf |f )ufn) + ufn
]
,
Ψn=1− α+ α
[
(k − 1)(xf |nufn + (1 − xf |n)unn) + ufn
]
.
(54)
By substituting (54) and the local equilibria (21) into (53) and
adopting the similar approximation in Appendix A, we can
simplify (53) as
x˙DBf =
α(k − 2)(k + 1)
k(k − 1)
xf (1− xf )
[
(k − 2)(uff − 2ufn
+ unn)xf + uff + (k − 2)ufn − (k − 1)unn
]
, (55)
which is the diffusion dynamics under DB strategy update rule.
B. Diffusion Dynamics under IM Rule
The diffusion dynamics under IM strategy update rule can
be derived in a similar way. First, for the stable point of the
influence dynamics, it is the same as that under BD and DB
strategy update rules as shown in (21). Secondly, the analysis
of population dynamics under IM strategy update rule is quite
similar with that under the DB rule, since the only difference
between the IM and DB strategy update rules is that the user
may imitate his/her own strategy in the IM rule as shown
in Fig. 2-(b) and (c). Thus, the diffusion dynamics under IM
strategy update rule can be derived by taking into account the
probability of one user remaining his/her strategy unchanged,
which is
x˙IMf =
αk(k − 2)(k + 3)
(k − 1)(k + 1)2
xf (1− xf )
[
(k − 2)(uff − 2ufn
+ unn)xf + uff + (k − 2)ufn − (k − 1)unn
]
. (56)
C. Equivalence
Comparing the diffusion dynamics under three kinds of
strategy update rules, i.e., (50), (55) and (56), we can see
that they have exactly the same form of expressions with the
only difference in terms of coefficient, i.e., the BD rule is with
coefficient α(k−2)(k−1) , the DB rule is with coefficient
α(k−2)(k+1)
k(k−1)
and the IM rule is with coefficient αk(k−2)(k+3)(k−1)(k+1)2 . In such
a case, when the network degree k is sufficiently large, all
those three coefficients would tend to α, which means that the
diffusion dynamics over uniform degree networks under those
three kinds of strategy update rules are equivalent with each
other. This completes the proof of the theorem.
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In the derivation of local dynamics of the uniform degree
networks, i.e., the proof of Lemma 1, the “k” in (15) and (16)
represents the degree of the replaced neighbor. In the non-
uniform scenario, the degree of the replaced neighbor obeys
some distribution, instead of constant k. Note that if a pair is
selected by random, the degree distribution of the user on the
specific pair is not λ(k) but rather kλ(k)∑+∞
k=0
kλ(k)
[36]. In such a
case, the average degree of the replaced neighbor is
+∞∑
k=0
k
kλ(k)∑+∞
k=0 kλ(k)
=
k2
k
, (57)
where k2 =
∑+∞
k=0 k
2λ(k) is the expectation of k2. For the
non-uniform scenario, when calculating the average increase
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and decrease of the (Sf ,Sf ) pairs in a unit update period, we
need take expectations with respect to the “k” in (15) and (16).
Moreover, the denominator in (17), which represents the total
number of edges in the network, should be Nk/2. Thus, the
local dynamics of the non-uniform degree networks becomes
x˙f |n=
2
k
{(k2
k
− 1
)[
xf |fxf |n + xf |n(1− xf |n)
]
−
k2
k
xf |n
}
,
(58)
x˙f |f =
2
k
{
1+
(k2
k
−1
)[
xf |fxf |f+xf |n(1−xf |f)
]
−
k2
k
xf |f
}
.
(59)
The local equilibrium of the information diffusion dynamics
over non-uniform degree networks becomes
x∗f |n =
(k2 − 2k)xf
k2 − k
, x∗f |f =
(k2 − 2k)xf + k
k2 − k
. (60)
For the global dynamics, we also need to consider the
distribution of users’ degrees. Since the “k” in (49) represents
the degree of the selected user, we can directly take expectation
on it and obtain the global dynamics of the non-uniform degree
networks as
x˙f =
αxf (1 − xf |f )(k − 1)
Ψ
·[
(uff − ufn)xf |f − (unn − ufn)(1− xf |n)
]
. (61)
Similarly, by substituting (60) into (61) and approximating Ψ,
we have
x˙f =
α(k − 1)(k2 − 2k)
(k2 − k)2
xf (1− xf )
[
(k2 − 2k)(uff − 2ufn
+ unn)xf + kuff + (k2 − 2k)ufn − (k2 − k)unn
]
.(62)
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